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On the Concepts of Disorder, 




Over the last two decades, concepts of “disorder as political instrument in 
Africa,” “politics of belly,” and “re-traditionalization” (Chabal, Daloz, 199) 
have been used and reused in African studies by European and African 
scholars to describe the African social and political condition of the last 
decades. However, despite their canonization, one can question their 
efficiency and relevance to the analysis and understanding of what is really 
happening in postcolonial Africa. One might even wonder if these analytical 
concepts are not reawakening the imaginary of the colonial anthropology 
which pathologized the “Dark Continent” in order to enclose it in its 
difference and represent it as the absolute alterity as Hegel did in his 
philosophical ethnography. 
My intention here is to problematize these concepts by showing their 
limits and ambiguity. I will suggest that one should not use such marked 
concepts as “disorder,” “retraditionalisation,” “abnormality” without 
interrogating their archaeology. This is an ethical and scientific exigency, 
particularly if we want anthropology or social sciences to be, as Mudimbe 
puts it, a real anthropou-logos, that is a discourse on Human Being (Mudimbe 
1988: 186) or on human societies. But my ultimate intention is to suggest that 
the concept of Crisis, which was mobilized by European philosophers of the 
Crisis (Husserl, Heidegger, Cassirer, etc.), and which, at the wake of the 
independences, has been mobilized by African philosophers and social 
sciences scholars (Benoît Verhaegen, Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, Kä Mana, 
Dimandja, among others) in their attempts to analyse and understand their 
postcolonial condition, could be more efficient for analysing what is going 
on in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore instead of being seen as the signs of 
irrationality, pathology or abnormality of African societies, tensions, 
conflicts, factors of mobilization and change, as well as contradictions, can 
1 0 2  |  O n  t h e  C o n c e p t s  o f  D i s o r d e r ,  R e t r a d i t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  
a n d  C r i s i s  i n  A f r i c a n  S t u d i e s  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.760 
appear as manifestations of a profound crisis which is to be understood not 
only as a revealing moment but also as the most real essence of the 
contemporary (modern) society in search for new rationalities and new 
social and political orders.  
 
Disorder and Retraditionalization, or the way Africa works 
As we all know, concepts of “disorder as political instrument in Africa” and 
re-traditionalization” were made popular by the acclaimed book, Africa 
Works. Disorder as Political instrument in Africa by Patrick Chabal and Jean-
Pascal Daloz. Brilliant and tremendous, this book was immediately 
translated in French as: L’Afrique est partie. Le désordre comme instrument 
politique en Afrique. This title echoed René Dumont’s famous essay, L’Afrique 
noire est mal partie, considered as the landmark of Afropessimism. It is this 
echo that renders the title of Chabal and Daloz’s work very interesting and 
anguishing in its oxymoronic formulation. In fact, is it not contradictory or 
at the very least ironic and cynical to state: Africa works, but through disorder 
as instrument or, as others say, through incoherent and irrational conducts? 
In fact, it is this paradox that attracted the attention of francophone 
Africanists, mainly from France.  
Indeed, when we examine the reactions to Patrick Chabal and Jean-
Pascal Daloz’s book, we can see that it has generated mixed feelings in its 
francophone readers who still had Réné Dumont’s famous book, False Start 
in Africa (L’Afrique est mal partie), in the back of their minds. In other words, 
there has been a conscious or unconscious expectation when dealing with 
the representation of Africa for at least five decades. If on the one hand, 
readers initially applauded the vigour with which the authors defend their 
thesis – namely that Africa works, but in its own way –, on the other hand, 
some do not hesitate to confess to a vague malaise, while others state 
explicitly that the book poses not only epistemological problems but also, if 
not mainly, problems of an ethical nature and this, despite the admission of 
the authors to want to be positioned beyond good and evil, to produce not 
only a scientific work or, perhaps more so, scientistic, by keeping only to 
facts or observable behaviours, which implies that we are completely free 
from ideological inertia of the place from which we are speaking. René 
Luneau, a specialist of religious phenomenon in Africa, and Colette Dubois 
are representative of the first category, while Jean-François Médard, who 
wrote a critical analysis of Africa Works, represents the second.  
The first lines of René Luneau’s book review suggest a vague malaise. If 
he shares René Dumont’s view that, in the wake of the independences, 
Africa was off to a bad start, and seems to recognize the originality of the 
approach undertaken by the authors of Africa Works, he does not stop 
himself from suggesting to the careful reader his difficulty in writing: ”That 
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Africa works, well or rather badly as René Dumont once thought, of this, no 
one is in doubt. But that the continent managed to make a political 
instrument of a certain number of behaviours that are at first glance unusual 
if not aberrant, in social, economic, religious domains, this is what is 
surprising.” How are we to understand the adjective “surprising” if not as a 
synonym for disconcerting or unexpected. It is indeed this adjective which 
crystallizes René Luneau’s malaise. But do not be mistaken. In fact, despite 
the apparent discomfort or reservation first expressed towards the thesis of 
Africa Works – René Luneau is almost certain that the book “will generate 
many controversies” – he quite quickly changes sides unambiguously 
supporting elements of Chabal and Daloz’s thesis.  
Our authors point out, and rightly so it seems “the extraordinary 
ability of Africans to appeal quasi-simultaneously to multiple 
registers, even contradictory, without concern with coherence. It is 
a question of, while being at the mercy of circumstances, to instead 
of playing on one or the other. (…) In black Africa, it proves not 
only permissible but profitable to operate on all available ranges 
(…) African modernity paradoxically encourages them to draw on 
traditions and to use them dynamically … It goes without saying 
that the same logic is at work in the religious world and that we can 
even make good use of witchcraft (Luneau 2001: 74) 
At the end of the review, Chabal and Dalloz’s work is, surprisingly, 
described as “iconoclastic and highly stimulating.” In other words, the 
malaise felt at the start, quickly gave way to an acquiescence tinged with 
exultation and to a total support of their stripping analyses. The discomfort 
which was initially that of the author migrates to the reader who has 
carefully read the book under review. The reader can, indeed, ask whether 
the initial discomfort felt by René Luneau was not just feigned or if the 
opening of the review was a mere rhetorical game. Given that René Luneau 
is renowned as a specialist of religious phenomenon in Africa, it is 
appropriate to question whether the introduction describing “behaviours 
that are at first sight unusual if not aberrant,”  “contradictory” and 
“incoherent” – the adjectives are well chosen – do not discredit the African 
religiosity that he has celebrated.  
Admittedly, it would be unfair to judge the seriousness of a researcher 
from a short book review written generously to help disseminate the work 
of Africanist colleagues. But the review may be symptomatic of other issues. 
Indeed, if we give credence to Congolese theologian Benoît Awazi Mbambi 
in his essay De la postcolonie à la mondialisation néolibérale, the view expressed 
implicitly in the book review can be found deployed in another work by 
René Luneau with the fairly ambitious title: Comprendre l’Afrique. Évangile, 
modernité et mangeur d’âmes. Benoît Awazi suggests that if Luneau has well 
identified the religious mutations that occur in postcolonial Africa, he seems 
nonetheless unable to interpret them without first resorting to the patterns 
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of outdated ethnography which pathologized Africa as irrational and 
secondly, to an orthodoxy or normality of which the West would be the 
embodiment (Awazi Mbambi 2011: 31-34). The demons of the past struggle 
against being laid to rest. 
L’ouvrage de R. Luneau : Comprendre l’Afrique. Evangile, modernité et 
mangeur d’âmes, écrit Awazi, fourmille de récits et de faits qui 
révèlent, selon lui, l’irrationalité génétique des cultures africaines, 
où les questions liées à la sorcellerie, à la magie, à l’envoûtement et 
à l’inflation d’étiologies irrationnelles pour expliquer la crise sont 
légion. Bien qu’il faille reconnaître une bonne part de véracité 
empirique et narrative dans les faits racontés et rapportés dans son 
ouvrage … il n’en demeure pas moins vrai que R. Luneau occulte 
volontairement la violence sauvage et démesurée qui a présidé à 
l’évangélisation et à la colonisation de l’Afrique… En oubliant que 
les couches populaires interprètent la violence irrationnelle et 
symbolique de la sorcellerie, en se basant sur la violence non moins 
réelle, physique et effective de la colonisation militaire de l’Afrique 
et des dictatures nègres postcoloniales, R. Luneau se ferme les voies 
pour une compréhension dynamique et dialectique de l’inflation 
sociopolitique et religieuse des phénomènes relatifs à la sorcellerie 
dans les grandes mégalopoles africaines (Awazi Mbambi, 33-34) 
[The book by R. Luneau : Comprendre l’Afrique. Evangile, modernité et 
mangeur d’âmes, writes Awazi, abounds with stories and facts that 
reveal, according to him, the genetic irrationality of African 
cultures, where issues related to witchcraft, magic, enchantment 
and the inflation of irrational etiologies to explain crisis are legion. 
Though one must recognize a good deal of empirical and narrative 
truth in the facts described and reported in his book … it is 
nevertheless true that R. Luneau deliberately obscures the wild and 
excessive violence which presided over the evangelization and 
colonization of Africa … While forgetting that the working class 
interprets the irrational and symbolic violence as witchcraft, by 
basing himself on the equally real violence stemming from the 
physical and effective of the military colonisation of African and of 
black postcolonial dictatorships, R. Luneau closes himself from 
paths leading to a dynamic and dialectic understanding of the 
sociopolitical and religious inflation of phenomenon related to 
witchcraft in large African megalopolises.  (Ibid., 33-34)] 
In other words, what is lacking in René Luneau’s analysis of phenomena 
that he describes as irrational is a comprehensive framework and an 
appropriate interpretation of phenomenon observed empirically. Hence, 
perhaps, the use of the adjective “aberrant” which, if we trust the Petit 
Robert, means “that which deviates from the norm,” “that which deviates 
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from the rule, goes astray, is contrary to reason.” Moreover, this is also 
insinuated by the authors of Africa Works who, while holding their own, 
seem to take what is happening in the West as “the norm” in relation to 
what takes place in Africa, more specifically, in black Africa, which could be 
called abnormal, if not pathological. 
But, as I have suggested, the most interesting reaction to Africa Works – 
L’Afrique est partie, is, without a doubt, that of Jean-François Médard entitled 
“L’État et le politique en Afrique” published in the Revue française de science 
politique (vol 50, numéro 4-5 (2000), pp. 849-54). As in the case of René 
Luneau, the author begins by admitting unease if not feelings of discomfort 
towards the book which, he writes, “has something stripping and 
salubrious.” He adds: 
Pourtant l’ouvrage nous pose un problème : comment se fait-il 
qu’un travail dont nous partageons bien des analyses nous laisse 
une telle impression de malaise? L’impression dominante qui se 
dégage à la lecture de l’ouvrage est celle d’une Afrique 
irrémédiablement enfermée dans son passé, d’une histoire 
répétitive et d’une incapacité de ce continent à se transformer en 
profondeur et à se développer, suivant les normes occidentales, 
précisent-ils chaque fois. Non pas que l’Afrique resterait figée dans 
un passé intemporel et archaïque – ils insistent à la suite de la 
plupart des auteurs, sur la dynamique du continent et prétendent 
qu’il se modernise “à sa façon,” mais en parlant de 
“retraditionalisation,” ils laissent bien entendre que ce qui change 
est secondaire par rapport à ce qui perdure. 
[Yet the book presents us with a problem: how is it that a work 
upon which we share many analyses leaves us such a feeling of 
unease? The dominant impression which emerges from reading the 
book is that of an Africa irretrievably locked in its past, of a 
repetitive history and of an inability to fundamentally transform 
and grow, following Western standards, they specify each time. 
Not that Africa would remain frozen in a timeless and archaic past 
– they insist, following in the vein of most authors, on the dynamics 
of the continent and claim that it is modernizing “in its own way,” 
but by speaking of “retraditionalization,” they make it clear that 
what changes is secondary to what endures.] 
The author does not limit himself to this general statement which is already 
rich in nuance; he throws himself more deeply in the analysis of the book 
and specifies the reasons for his “profound malaise” and, sometimes, for his 
disagreement. These reasons are twofold: epistemological and ethical, the 
two being for that matter linked. Is it not true that in the field of humanities 
and social sciences (about which we can always wonder to what extent and 
under what conditions they can be described as sciences), the 
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epistemological and the methodological, even when they seek objectivity, 
are more closely related to ethics than we think? 
In epistemological terms, Jean-François Médard’s “profound malaise” is 
due to an overly scientistic conception of the social sciences both in terms of 
the classic problem of axiological neutrality as well as the no less classic 
problem of determinism. The French political scientist thinks that the two 
authors have gone too far in radically and exclusively opposing the 
analytical and realistic approach and the normative point of view. Indeed, as 
he writes: 
Une telle position qui prétend adopter le point de vue de Sirius, ne 
(…) semble pas défendable ni d’un point de vue éthique ni d’un 
point de vue scientifique, alors même que l’aspiration à la 
neutralité axiologique reste un point cardinal de notre démarche. 
Nos interprétations scientifiques ne sont pas formulées dans le 
vide, elles sont récupérées et réinterprétées par les acteurs sociaux 
et politiques.  
[Such a position, which claims to adopt the point of view of Sirius, 
does not … seem defensible either from an ethical point of view or 
from a scientific point of view, even though the desire for 
axiological neutrality remains a cardinal point in our approach. 
Our scientific interpretations are not formulated in a vacuum, they 
are recovered and reinterpreted by social and political actors.] 
And he adds, insisting on ethical issues accompanying such a position 
which claim essentially to be scientific or epistemological:  
Qu’on le veuille ou non, ce que nous écrivons n’est pas neutre. Une 
certaine manière de distanciation débouche sur le cynisme, qu’il 
soit apparent ou réel, et donc une justification implicite des 
pratiques qu’on est en bon droit de condamner, tout en 
poursuivant une démarche scientifique. Il est trop commode et 
confortable, ajoute Médard, alors même qu’ils diagnostiquent par 
ailleurs de façon lucide les problèmes que rencontrent l’Afrique, 
d’écrire qu’après tout c’est cela l’Afrique : Africa Works, l’Afrique est 
partie! Sous prétexte qu’il s’agit de prendre en considération les 
représentations des acteurs et que le comportement des Africains 
est rationnel par rapport à leurs représentations. 
[Like it or not, what we write is not neutral. Somehow detachment 
leads to cynicism, whether apparent or real, and becomes therefore 
an implicit justification of practices that we would be right to 
condemn, while pursuing a scientific approach. It is too convenient 
and comfortable, adds Médard, even though they diagnose lucidly 
the problems facing Africa, to write that after all, this is Africa: 
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Africa Works, l’Afrique est partie! Under the pretext that it is a matter 
of taking into consideration the representations of actors and that 
the behaviour of Africans is rational in relation to their 
representations.  
In fact, the real risk run by the individual who claims to take the mental 
universe that governs this sort of phenomenon seriously following the 
example of corruption described in Chabal’s book, is of slipping 
surreptitiously from legitimate consideration of “the moral economy of 
corruption” (J.P. Olivier de Sardan), permitting an illumination of 
mechanisms, with the idea that, according to the established formula, 
despite its quite problematic character, “the African does not know 
corruption.” What results is if we can ultimately speak of “politics of belly,” 
we cannot speak of “corruption in Africa,” this latter concept being an 
ethnocentric concept. But what is to be made then of the frequent 
denunciations and protests of ordinary individuals against corruption? How 
can we justify the many associations, which, today, take on the mission of 
fighting against corruption and promoting transparency in the African 
management of public affairs? Finally, what attitude should we have when 
facing those who pay the heavy price of a corrupt society that is excluded 
from accessing vital resources? 
Moreover, Jean-François Médard notes that despite their scientistic 
claim, the two authors do not manage to distance themselves from a 
normative perspective. In fact, how can we speak of disorder or inefficiency 
without referring to norms? Even if we refer to positive norms, such as order 
and rationality, to counterbalance negative norms, we have still not moved 
beyond normativity. More concretely, how can we understand expressions 
such as economic development or failure ”in the Western sense of the term” 
without using the West as the benchmark, the norm from which we can 
speak of failure or success?  
The second pitfall Jean-François Médard raises is as crucial as the first. 
He suggests precisely how scientific discourse in the humanities and social 
sciences can be an imposed violence on the object which we claim to speak 
about, in the sense that, under the guise of discovering or speaking about the 
object, it is presented through a distorting prism, that of the dominant 
scientific ideology and the status of the researcher in a given society. As 
Mudimbe writes in his essay L’Autre face du Royaume, judiciously subtitled: 
Une introduction aux langages en folie, and in L’odeur du Père, “the problem is 
then knowing how scholarly constructions that claim to take it (ideology) 
into account can correspond to reality; and secondly, what ‘scientific’ 
exercises allow, in the case of formalist and positivist sociology, to evacuate 
ideology.” (1982 : 55) The problem which arises concerns all disciplines that 
have the social as object, especially once one agrees, as Mudimbe suggests 
again in L’Odeur du père, “that everything that is social escapes from 
processes of reduction and from all modalities of objectification. When 
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approaching the social as object and claiming to explain it signifies also 
evacuating the subject from experience, denying it radically. Thus, as stated 
R. Laing, ‘falsifying our perception to fit our concepts’ while it is obvious 
that even for specialists of the social sciences, ‘human reality is irreducible to 
knowledge. It must be lived and produced’” (Ibid : 52-53).  
With regards to Chabal and Daloz specifically, Jean-François Médard 
draws our attention to the fact that we can consider that the image of the 
fatalist African/Africa which emerges from their work is the effect or, if you 
will, the product of their deterministic conception of the social sciences 
based on confusion between probability and causality. He writes: 
Malgré quelques précautions sémantiques, l’ouvrage est totalement 
verrouillé et ne laisse aucune échappatoire. Or, malgré les 
contraintes structurelles considérables qui ont engendré des 
pesanteurs culturelles qui en aggravent les effets, il n’y a pas 
davantage de fatalité en Afrique qu’ailleurs. Une conception aussi 
déterministe des sciences sociales me semble dépassée. Elle repose 
sur la confusion entre probabilité et causalité.  Comme l’a bien 
montré Norman Uphoff, les sciences sociales en sont restées à 
l’épistémologie de la physique newtonienne et n’ont pas vraiment 
intégré la notion d’incertitude et de probabilité. 
[Despite some semantic precautions, the book is completely locked 
and does not leave room for any loopholes. Yet, despite 
considerable structural constraints that have led to cultural 
constraints which exacerbate the impact, there is not more fatality 
in Africa than elsewhere. Such a deterministic conception of the 
social sciences seems outdated. It is based on confusion between 
probability and causality. As Norman Uphoff has well 
demonstrated, social sciences have remained within the 
epistemology of Newtonian physics and have not really embraced 
the notion of uncertainty and probability.] 
There is another effect of the deterministic design of both authors 
highlighted by Médard: it consists of neutralizing the differences between 
the trajectories of various African states, under the pretext that they are not 
significant.  Thus we are left with a catch-all concept of Black Africa where 
Botswana is the same as Burundi, Namibia is the same as the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo or Cameroon etc. Ultimately, facing the 
representation of Africa that emerges from the book, one could reproach – 
but is it really a reproach? – the pair who flaunted their claims to realism, to 
be condemned like other less ambitious attempts, presenting nothing but 
theoretical constructions about African societies.  
The fundamental problem thus posed and to which we have already 
alluded is that of knowing under what conditions, in the social sciences, a 
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description can express the truth and authenticity of an experience or a 
social situation. When we look closely, we come to realize that what 
Mudimbe wrote about the undertakings of Herodotus, Thucydides and 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus can apply to the authors of Africa Works with 
their claims to scientificity and to quasi-absolute objectivity. He notes that 
each initiative is, from the outset, marked by a question, by a concern. 
Prisoner of an epistemological framework, it is also locked in its own 
scientific and legal options and, under the pretext of “speaking about 
something,“ it only further leads to the consequences of its own 
assumptions, making use of a  “good” or a “bad” subjectivity. This amounts 
to saying that there is no strictly objective discourse about a society, past or 
present (Mudimbe 1973: 93). And further, he significantly adds: “In this 
regard, G. Gusdorf pertinently noted that the explanatory interpretation of 
human reality according to scientific ideology, fascinated by the success of 
experimental sciences, can only be a sort of wish, a faraway ideal in relation 
to which the most positive historians will always feel caught“ (Mudimbe 
1973:  94) and will elicit a smile, if not a laugh, that according to Michel 
Foucault, we can dare to describe as philosophical or ironic. 
Faced with the scientistic claims of the authors, we cannot forget Michel 
Foucault who, about ethnology, though his remarks may extend to other 
disciplines in the field of humanities, suggests that whatever its 
methodological refinements, it is rooted in the possibility that belongs in its 
own right to the history of Western culture, “even more to its fundamental 
relation with the whole of history, and enables it to link itself to other 
cultures in a mode of pure theory.“ (Foucault 2001: 411). And he adds very 
judiciously:  
Obviously, this does not mean that the colonizing situation is 
indispensable to ethnology: neither hypnosis, nor the patient’s 
alienation within the fantasmatic character of the doctor, is 
constitutive of psychoanalysis; but just as the latter can be deployed 
only in the calm violence of a particular relationship and the 
transference it produces, so ethnology can assume its proper 
dimensions only within the historical sovereignty – always 
restrained, but always present – of European thought and the 
relation that can bring it face to face with all other cultures as well 
as with itself itself. (Foucault, 411) 
Other points could justify, mutatis mutandis, the use of V.-Y. Mudimbe and 
Michel Foucault’s ideas discussed above. Examples include the updating of 
a caracteristic opposition which Mudimbe, in The Invention of Africa (1988: 3), 
referred to as the “colonizing structure” with its system of opposition which 
structures Africanist literature. Chabal and Daloz recuse the use of the 
concept of the individual in the African context. In fact, for both authors, 
speaking of the individual in Africa is an abuse of language because the 
modernization of the continent occurs within a non-individualistic 
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conception as opposed to the individualistic conception, which prevails in 
the West. But more interesting is, on the one hand, the characterization of 
the State in Africa as a “’complete illusion’ or ‘a superficial front,’“ while on 
the other hand, people lost their lives to defend it. I am referring for instance 
to the March of Christians in Kinshasa in 1992 to demand for the reopening 
of the National Conference whose mission was to rebuild the Congolese 
state. Many lost their lives for a “complete illusion”! This applies as much to 
the reduction of civil society in Africa to a complete illusion or to non-
existence. Again, one might ask, as Médard proposes, how to understand all 
the upheaval that followed the assassination of Nobert Zongo in Burkina 
Faso in 1998 and, more recently, the assassination of the renowned defender 
of human rights, Rigobert Chebeya, in Congo-Kinshasa. Is it not once again 
in relation to the normativity of civil society in the West that the absence of 
civil society is categorically stated?   
Following Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, in an essay entitled “Société civile: 
Analyse, diagnostique et ‘prescription’,” one wonders whether a nominalist 
approach to “civil society” was not more efficient than a quasi-dogmatic and 
normative one?  As Fabien Eboussi-Boulaga suggests, “nominalism reminds 
us that the expression of civil society does not evoke the same thing for 
everyone, it has neither an obvious meaning nor an evident reference point. 
Nominalism enjoins us to give all of our attention to the uses that are made 
by those who employ them, to raise an issue, to express the feeling or desire 
for a solution.“ (Eboussi Boulaga 2005 : 47)  Then we can work to ensure that 
what we saw at work, in action “finds in itself the lucidity and the theory of 
practice that is to say the tools to judge and evaluate itself, to take change 
and to rectify itself.“ (Ibid.: 55) 
These remarks echo the method implemented in Les conférences 
nationales en Afrique. Une affaire à suivre (1993) where, to referring to Hannah 
Arendt, the Cameroonian philosopher speaks of “an elucidating thought“ 
which “is born from the events of lived experience and must remain linked 
to them as to its unique appropriate guide.“ (Arendt 1972: 26) In accordance 
with this elucidating thought, to analyse the modes of existence of civil 
society in Africa is to explain the internal structure of which, in Africa, 
presents itself as such, reveals its internal logic and its avowed aims of 
action. “It is from one and the other that we are at liberty to criticize, to give 
formal notice that the action undertaken is to be more rigorously faithful to 
itself, to its intentions and deeper tendencies, to go to its proper end.“ To 
proceed in this way, to plunge “in the flux of actuality to uncover its 
meaning, its implicit “normativity” (Eboussi Boulaga, 1993 : 10) is, in a 
certain way “joining its existence to the totality of the historical moment and 
to join the world by contributing to its elaboration.“ (Ladrière 1955 : 19)  
Anyone positioned within such a perspective never discovers the eternal 
laws that weigh upon us, like determinism and the fatality of our humanity, 
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our cultural legacy or of an obscure supernatural curse. They exhibit their 
necessity and contingency, all together, that is to say, their historicity. 
Ultimately, it is appropriate to ask whether the illusory character of African 
civil society is not the invention of Chabal and Daloz’s same closed system 
of analysis and explanation, a system whose implementation necessitated 
the quarantining of disruptive elements considered, a priori, as 
insignificant? The explanation could be even more simple: was it possible to 
speak of the existence of a civil society in Africa since the State itself is a 
“complete illusion” or “a superficial front“?  The following expression of a 
proverbial nature could find meaning here: we invent what is found and we 
find what we invent.  
    
Taking a Stance: The Structural Impensé of Africanist 
Discourse  
Let us return to the major concepts used to describe and analyse Africa, 
namely those of disorder, of retraditionalization (which gives the impression 
that Africa is unchanging), the updating of the classical opposition between 
the individual and the community, the normativity of the Western 
experience, etc. When paying attention to the way these concepts are 
updated to characterize Africa, one cannot help but think of an impensé 
which, consciously or unconsciously, structures the discourse of both 
Africanists who, nolens volens, refers to a not so very distant state of the 
representation of Africa, an invented Africa by the “Colonial Library.” 
(Mudimbe 1988) The relationship of this impensé can be approached from 
what Michel Foucault said of the relationship of signification to the system. 
“Signification, he writes, is never primary and contemporaneous with itself, 
but always secondary and as it were derived in relation to a system that 
precedes it, constitutes its positive origin, and posits itself, little by little, in 
fragments and outlines through signification; in relation to the 
consciousness of a signification, the system is indeed always unconscious 
since it was there before the signification, the system is indeed always 
unconscious since it was there before the signification, since it is within it 
that the signification resides and on the basis of it that it becomes effective.“  
(Foucault  394-395) 
But what would be this impensé? Michel Foucault remains a good guide 
when attempting to characterize it. Indeed, presenting, in The Order of 
Things, the succession of the three dominant models in the recent history of 
the humanities – the biological model, the economic model, the philological 
model – that Michel Foucault indicates, another shift, observable in the game 
of precedence of the concepts constituting three pairs: function and norm, 
conflict and rule, signification and system. Once the canonical valance was 
accorded to the first terms (function, conflict, signification), as was the case 
in the 19th century, he suggests, we are witnessing clear epistemological 
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demarcation, disassociating two types of knowledge: on the one hand, 
sciences of normality, and on the other, that of pathologies. In this manner, 
“a pathological psychology was accepted side by side with normal 
psychology, but forming as it were an inverted image of it (…),  a pathology 
of societies (Durkheim), of irrational and quasi-morbid forms of belief 
(Lévy-Bruhl, Blondel) was also accepted; similarly, as long as the point of 
view of conflict carried more weight than that of the rule, it was supposed 
that certain conflicts could not be overcome (…) ; finally, as long as the point 
of view of signification carried more  weight than that of the system, a 
division was made between significant and non-significant : it was accepted 
that there was meaning in certain domains of human behaviour or certain 
regions of social area, but not in others.” (Foucault 393) What is thus 
indicated by Foucault is also what Jack Goody refers to as “the grant 
dichotomy” in The Domestication of the Savage Mind (1977), in which types of 
societies and ideas are established in a grid of binary oppositions of gender, 
historical versus ahistorical societies, civilization versus barbarism, 
domesticated thought versus wild thought, culminating in the opposition of 
Western versus non-Western. But, Foucault continues:   
When, on the other hand, the analysis was conducted from the 
point of view of the norm, the rule, and the system, each area 
provided its own coherence and its own validity; it was no longer 
possible to speak of ‘morbid consciousness’ even referring to the 
sick), of ‘primitive mentalities’ (even with reference to societies left 
behind by history) or of ‘insignificant discourse’ (even when 
referring to absurd stories, or to apparently incoherent legends). 
Everything may be thought within the order of the system, the rule, 
and the norm. (Ibid. 393) 
It seems to me that Michel Foucault’s remarks help indicate the underlying 
problem in Chabal and Daloz’s brilliant essay which, systematically, 
interprets “under negative grids what in rigorous Marxist analysis Benoît 
Verhaegen qualified a consequence of the colonial rule.” (Mudimbe 2013: 
409) They thus confine Africa to an ahistorical and quasi-pathological 
negativity, which is measured in terms of the norm represented by the West. 
This implies that Africa is not truly thought of within the logic of its own 
norms, of its own standards, of its internal rules, in short “within the logic of 
(its) own systems.” (Mudimbe 1997 : 40) 
The issue here is not to categorically reject the analyses of our 
Africanists and their African epigones, but rather to emphasize the 
ideological and ethical issues related to a negative reading of all society. It is 
a matter of re-evaluating any pretense of ethical neutrality when the social is 
the object of study. In this area more than any other, the epistemological and 
ethical responsibility of researchers is already engaged and the refusal to 
assume it can have huge consequences: among other things, considering 
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others that we meet in our research terrain as natural things, not endowed 
with freedom, who have no understanding of their situation and its 
historicity. Yet, as Jürgen Habermas emphasizes in Logique des sciences 
sociales, “social subjects proceed ahead of interpretations about their field of 
action. Their overt behaviour is but a fragment of communicative action as a 
whole. Hence the need for a methodological interpretation oriented towards 
the subjects. Scientific concepts must begin from interpretive frameworks of 
the actors themselves. The conceptual constructions draw on the reserves of 
prior knowledge, which, transmitted by tradition, guides and interprets 
daily practices and even rebuilds them at the same time. Scientific constructs 
are located in the second degree.“ (Habermas 1987: 141) 
It is non even a question of challenging the concept of disorder as a 
political instrument, but to emphasize this, that seems crucial: to make sense 
of events in human and social history, we needs to cast our gaze into the 
epistemological mutations which have shaped them and the politics which 
have provided the context of their possibility. It is in this vein that, in his 
book, The Sacrifice of Africa, the Ugandan academic Emmanuel Katongole, 
stressed that it is not evident that the chaos, the war and the corruptions in 
african State are indicators of bankruptcy or if you will, of the superficial 
nature of the state in Africa. To reach this conclusion, one must have taken 
the time to question the founding narrative in which the postcolonial state 
and its institutions are inscribed, and to ask himself “why it works in the 
way it does.” In fact, for Katongole, chaos, war, and corruption are not 
indications of a failed institution; they are ingrained in the very imagination 
and script of modern Africa. (2011: 2)  
It is this kind work, it seems to me, that African intellectuals have been 
engaged with since the 1970s by emphasizing a concept which could be 
more fecund than that of disorder, in that it is not limited to observing how 
Africa works but most of all why Africa works in this way. This is the 
concept of “crisis” if not of “megacrisis” as preferred by the young African 
philosophers who, inspired by Mudimbe’s work, launched, in the 1980s, at 
the Catholic University of Louvain, a philosophical movement called “Les 
Nouvelles Rationalités Africaines.” The concept seems fair to me because the 
task that lies before us is to understand, without renewing past imaginaries, 
what is happening, to enter into its logic and spirit to extend, consolidate 
and rectify trajectories, in short, to be attentive of precisely what emerges 
from the chaos. This means that crisis is understood “as the time of speech 
(word), of historicity and genesis“ (Eboussi 2014 : 113), therefore of 
negotiations between the old and the new for the emergence of new trends, 
new subjectivities and new sociabilities. 
In fact, as suggested by Célestin Monga, Africa needs bold theorists of a 
new sociability, capable to evaluate the positivity which hides behind the 
most innocuous behaviours, contradictory or incoherent at first glance. But 
for that, Africa must be liberated from paralyzing paradigms (paradigms of 
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bankruptcy, of disorder, of abnormality) that tend “to govern any 
progressive thinking on African societies, and to distort the terms of a 
substantive debate on the future of democracy on the continent.“ (Monga, 
1994 : 81) Essentially, as Eboussi Boulaga suggests, the challenge is in this 
mental reversal of thinking of Africa as a finality without end, without 
assigning targets and external goals, but as what emerges from the vital 
power of the living multitude practicing, in these natural and historical 
spaces, by millions of microscopic daily actions, by interaction, of these 
millions of people adapting their conditions of existence, by modifying 
them, creating them trying to make their lives livable, that is tolerable and 
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